'Mughal Mania' under Zia ul-Haq by Dedebant, C.
Without going deep into details of the selec-
tive brand of Islamization the state promot-
ed, let us say that the regime was above all a
dictatorship: eleven years of military rule
(1977-1988) that ended only with Zia ul-
HaqÕs death. ZiaÕs Islamization programme
was mainly twofold: Firstly, it comprised a
deliberate attempt at reforming selective as-
pects of the penal code inherited from the
British through the Hudood Ordinances
(1979), the Law of Evidence (1984) and the
Blasphemy Law (1986). It was then a kind of
juridical b r i c o l a g e that tended to harm
above all women and religious minorities.
Secondly, it used propaganda through the
media (television, radio, and schoolbooks) in
favour of religious education, Arabization
(Zia ul-Haq himself put on an Arabic accent
when he was speaking in Urdu), sanctity of
the mosque, canonical Islam, and womenÕs
modesty (veiling, restriction of the image of
women in commercials and cinema). During
the 1980s, PakistanÕs national television was
notorious for John Wayne movies: a ho-
mosocial universe where, except for the sa-
loons, women were virtually absent.
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C H R I S T é L E  D E D E B A N T
As the first nation created as a religious asylum, Pak-
istan has a short but tormented history of fifty-four
years, half of which was controlled by a military
regime. Founded in the name of ÔIslam in dangerÕ by
Muhammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), Pakistan official-
ly elected Islam as the religion of the state in 1973,
during the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979),
the first popularly elected Prime minister of the coun-
try. Bhutto was arrested and hanged by general Zia
ul-Haq (1928-1988). While the Islamization rhetoric of
Bhutto was characterized by its mixture of socialism,
nationalism and populism, the discourse of Zia ul-
Haq appeared to be of a much more straightforward
military-Islamist type. In opposition to his rule, a
counter-discourse developed in which Mughal her-
itage was revived.
ÕMughal ManiaÕ
under Zia ul-Haq
Pakistani society responded to the state
Islamization process at different levels.
Some Ð extremely vocal Ð womenÕs groups,
intellectuals and journalists spoke out
against the policies, but among them were
also animators of the media scene (dancers,
painters, music bands, fashion designers,
etc.). The latter is a universe which, as a mat-
ter of fact, cannot do much without women
or the image of women. It was in the 1980s,
at the zenith of ZiaÕs dictatorship, that the
trope of the Mughal Empire, or rather a spe-
cific reflection of the lost Mughal splendour,
became a kind of passage oblig for a certain
section of the media.
It should be noted here that the Timurid
dynasty, widely known as the ÔMughalÕ dy-
nasty, founded by Babur in the mid-16t h
century, dominated India politically until
the 18t h century and culturally up to 1857
(which marked the Sepoy Mutiny). But by
the second half of the 19t h century, effective
Mughal power was no more than a memory.
What is now considered Pakistan was then
at the periphery of Mughal India, the heart
of which was Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri and Agra
(located in present-day India). The flamboy-
ant exception was Lahore, which for 13
years (1585-1598) was the main seat of the
1 6t h-century Great Moghul Akbar (1542-
1605) and one of the major imperial cities
during the Mughal period.
The ÔMughal miniatureÕ
The most prestigious art school in Pak-
istan, the National College of Arts (NCA, a
1 9t h-century institution built by the British),
became one of the centres for the revival of
the Mughal nostalgia dur-
ing Zia ul-HaqÕs era (when
non-figurative art and cal-
ligraphy became the domi-
nant ideological style). Mi-
niature painting was the
epitome of this attempt at
revival Ð not, of course, that
the reproduction and mer-
chandising of the so-called
ÔMughal miniatureÕ were
entirely new. In the 1970s,
for instance, under Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto the reclamation
of traditional Mughal style
became a part of the na-
tionalist rhetoric and the
miniature was regarded as
the perfect gift for visiting
d i g n i t a r i e s .1 But it was defi-
nitely under the regime of
Zia ul-Haq that ÔMughal
maniaÕ really took off at the
NCA, where art was pro-
moted as a major study, a
department in its own right.
The NCA, which is a semi-
governmental institution, al-
ways stood as a bastion
of liberalism (or objection-
able laissez-faire, according
to oneÕs convictions). It is a
co-educational institution
where the golden youth of
the country mix freely, fe-
male students and teachers
never donned the veil (even
at the peak of Zia ul-HaqÕs
regime); short hair (for girls),
tight t-shirts and cigarettes
are commonplace. In short,
in a milieu where study of
nudes is compulsory as a part of the curricu-
lum, the NCA was considered to be at the
forefront of ÔwesternizationÕ. Hence the im-
portance of this concept of Ôendangered Is-
lamic tradition of miniature artÕ vocally pro-
moted by the teachers from the 1980s on-
wards. However, the students, especially the
current generation of graduates, are more
than keen to shake the model of reference.
While portraits of the ÔGreat MughalsÕ (Je-
hangir, Shah Jahan, etc.) are still produced,
exhibited and sold, and the production tech-
nique is as close as possible to the original,
the graduates from the miniature depart-
ment have also produced a great deal of
avant-garde or engag work. For example, the
miniature entitled ÔStitched to OrderÕ (Sadir
Amin, 2000) reads as a critique of develop-
ment programmes for women, which identi-
fied the sewing machine as the key to eman-
cipation.
The empire strikes back
During the Zia years, the fashion scene
went through a tremendous change as well.
If Ôtruly IslamicÕ calligraphy was the regimeÕs
motto in the art scene, the anti-sari campaign
(the sari being seen as Hindu and non-Islam-
ic in origin) as well as anti-Western dress pro-
paganda (Western dress being seen as re-
pugnant to tradition) were very active in the
1980s. In the glamorous fashion scene, the
glittering splendours of the lost empire were
particularly revived, but not of course with-
out a heavy dose of eclecticism. In a country
where the vestiges of Muslim grandeur are
more likely to be found next door (in India),
Pakistani fashion designers created a fantas-
tic repertoire where the intricate, so-called
ÔMughalÕ embroidery (brocade, gold and silk)
coexisted with a kind of pastoral evocation
and pseudo-mystical inspiration: colourful
cotton peasant dress, ethnic jewellery and
even the accessories of religious mendicants
(such as amulets ÔrecycledÕ as necklaces). In
short, at a time when, following (or compet-
ing with) the government rhetoric, Arab-
style ca b a y a a n d h ij -a b, Iranian-style ch -a d a r,
and the South Asian tight and covering d u p-
p at -a (veiling) became more and more visible
in public spheres, the urban fashion scene
was celebrating the flamboyance of the
Mughal court, the colours of the countryside
and the mystical light of the Sufi saints. Such
an outcome would be fruitfully evaluated
through the problematic of hybridization, or
m  t i s s a g e as it recently has been developed
in contemporary research.2
Cosmetic though it may seem, this selec-
tive appropriation of the Ôethnico-mystical-
historicalÕ register was very much in accor-
dance with the strategy of certain oppo-
nents to ZiaÕs regime. Against the central-
ized state-sponsored Islamization, many in-
tellectuals opposed to Zia ul-HaqÕs dictator-
ship used the Sufi poets of the Sind and
Punjab as a political device to show how
much these figures of traditional Islam (or
traditional religiosity) had been the champi-
ons of the peopleÕs cause and the adver-
saries of tyranny. That this interpretation
might be somehow anachronistic and his-
torically inaccurate is not of concern here.
The purpose is to show how a kind of
counter-discourse Ð advocating the periph-
ery rather than the centre, pluralism rather
than a singular dogma, traditional mystical
poetry rather than universalist s h ar -õ ca Ð an
alternative way of presenting ÔauthenticityÕ
which does not necessarily deny but rather
questions the stateÕs propaganda, became
an extremely powerful force during ZiaÕs
t i m e .
It is ironic that more than 150 years after the
collapse of Muslim rule, the empire or (the
vestiges of the empire) struck back in certain
Pakistani media. Now, this consumption and
reconstruction of the past is in accordance
with what Hobsbawm has described as the
Ôinvention of traditionÕ. Admittedly these me-
diatic spheres were Ð consciously or uncon-
sciously Ð bypassing the censorship board
(which the Islamists successfully invested in
the 1980s) by using a historically defined, pro-
fane, mundane, but nonetheless resolutely Is-
lamicate register. The concept of Islamicate,
as coined by Hodgson, implies a repertoire
Ôreferring not directly to the religion, Islam it-
self, but to the social and cultural complex
historically associated with Islam and Mus-
lims, both among Muslims themselves and
even when found among non-MuslimsÕ. As he
rightly puts it, Ô[É] much of what [É] Muslims
have done as a part of the ÒIslamicÓ civiliza-
tion can only be characterized as Òun-IslamicÓ
in the [É] religious sense of the wordÕ.3 And
indeed, against the constant criticisms of
westernization and violation of tradition, the
strategy displayed by the animators of the
media scene paid off (and to a certain extent
still does).
Beyond the fear of the censorÕs scissors, in
a young nation like Pakistan (the r a i s o n
d Õ  t r e of which is still a matter of polemic)
this inventive derivation of a prestigious
Muslim grandeur et dcadence allows, in
HobsbawmÕs words again, Ôto establish con-
tinuity with a suitable historic pastÕ.4 T h e
strategy has also become a quest. Through
the media and artistic space, Pakistani cre-
ators seem to have presented a more plural-
istic view of what being a Muslim and a Pak-
istani could mean.
Stitched to Order.
